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NOTES
TAX EXEMPTION FOR
BUSINESS LEAGUES NARROWED-
NATIONAL MUFFLER DEALERS
ASSOCIATION, INC. V. UNITED STATES
When Congress adopted the modern income tax in 1913,1 it exempted
certain classes of organizations from federal income taxation. Business
leagues are one such tax-exempt class. The 1913 Act contained a specific
provision exempting business leagues from income taxation, 2 and the busi-
ness league exemption survives to the present day as part of Internal Rev-
enue Code section 501(c)(6).3 The scope of the exemption, however, is less
clear, and there has been considerable controversy concerning the types of
organizations that will qualify as "business leagues." 4  Organizations seeking
tax exemption understandably seek a broad definition of the term "business
league," while the Internal Revenue Service usually argues for stricter con-
struction. 5
Recently, in National Muffler Dealers Association, Inc. v. United States,6
the United States Supreme Court denied the business league exemption to
an association of retailers that had confined its membership to franchisees of
one company. In reaching its decision, the Court upheld the Internal Rev-
enue Service's restrictive interpretation 7 of the business league exemption.
1. Tariff Act of October 3, 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114 (1913) (codified in scattered sections
of 19, 26 & 46 U.S.C.).
2. Id. § II(G)(a), 38 Stat. 172.
3. I.R.C. § 501(c)(6) lists several types of exempt organizations, including therein: "Busi-
ness leagues, chambers of commerce, real-estate boards, boards of trade, or professional football
leagues (whether or not administering a pension fund for football players), not organized for
profit and no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder
or individual." Other tax-exempt organizations include labor unions (§ 501(c)(5)), credit unions
(§ 501(c)(14)), and churches (§ 501(d)). Although the statutory exemption is not absolute (see
I.R.C. § 511-15, providing for taxation of "unrelated business income"), tax exemption con-
tinues to be extremely valuable to many organizations. Donations to a church, for example, are
not taxable income to the church. Similarly, a labor union does not pay taxes on dues levied and
received.
4. See generally B. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 260-76 (3d ed.
1979); 6 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 34.20 (1975); Note, Creation.of
Tax-Exempt Business Leagues: For the Section 501(cX6) "First Timer", 16 WASHBURN L.J. 628
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Note].
5. See, e.g., notes 39-40 and accompanying text infra.
6 440 U.S. 472 (1979).
7. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(6)-1 (1978). This regulation limits the business league exemption
by defining a "business league" as
• .. an association of persons having some common business interest, the purpose
of which is to promote such common interest and not to engage in a regular busi-
ness of a kind ordinarily carried on for profit. It is an organization of the same
general class as a chamber of commerce or board of trade. Thus, its activities should
be directed to the improvement of. business conditions of one or more lines of
business as distinguished from the performance of particular services for individual
persons. An organization whose purpose is to engage in a regular business' of a kind
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The Court then addressed a conflict between the Second 8 and Seventh9
Circuits over the exemption's applicability to common franchisor associa-
tions. The National Muffler Court upheld the Second Circuit's denial of
exemption to one such group, but failed to state whether all common fran-
chisor associations now will be denied exemption as a matter of law, or
whether some such associations might qualify for exemption if their activities
do, in fact, meet the Internal Revenue Service test.
This Note traces the history of the business league exemption and dem-
onstrates that, notwithstanding a clear line of prior case law supporting the
National Muffler result, the Court erred in its failure to clarify the exemp-
tion's remaining applicability to common franchisor associations. An alterna-
tive standard, which grants exemptions based solely on an association's ac-
tivities, is proposed. The decision's restrictive impact on the business league
exemption is discussed and comment is addressed to the United States Su-
preme Court's reaffirmance of its policy of deferring to the Internal Revenue
Service.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Midas International Corporation, a large retailer of automobile mufflers, 10
conducts a substantial part of its business through a network of several
hundred dealer/franchisees. 11 In 1971, Midas franchisees formed the Na-
tional Muffler Dealers Association (Association), a nonprofit corporation that
was intended to strengthen its members' bargaining position vis-a-vis
ordinarily carried on for profit, even though the business is conducted on a coopera-
tive basis or produces only sufficient income to be self-sustaining, is not a business
league. An association engaged in furnishing information to prospective investors, to
enable them to make sound investments, is not a business league, since its activities
do not further any common business interest, even though all of its income is de-
voted to the purpose stated. A stock or commodity exchange is not a business
league, a chamber of commerce, or a board of trade within the meaning of section
501(c)(6) and is not exempt from tax.
8. See National Muffler Dealers Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 565 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1977).
Exemption was not allowed to an association of muffler dealers, all of whom shared a common
franchisor. The Second Circuit upheld the Internal Revenue Service position that a business
league must benefit one or more lines of business to qualify for tax exemption, an interpretation
that prevented the National Muffler plaintiff from qualifying as a business league. Id. at 846-48.
9. See Pepsi-Cola Bottlers' Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 369 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1966).
Exemption was allowed to an association of soft drink bottlers, all of whom shared a common
franchisor. The Pepsi court reasoned that the exemption could not be denied merely because all
association members bottled a particular soft drink product. Id. at 252. But see notes 43-48 and
accompanying text infra.
10. National Muffler Dealers Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 565 F.2d .845, 847 n.2 (2d Cir.
1977). The Second Circuit decision articulated data presented by a market researcher who had
conducted a study for Midas. This testimony suggested that, in 18 major metropolitan areas,
Midas owned a 21% share of the muffler replacement market.
11. National Muffler Dealers Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979). The Court
suggested that, during 1971-73, there were approximately 580 Midas dealers. Id. at 473 n.2.
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Midas. 12 Service as a bargaining agent has, in fact, been the Association's
principal activity. 13 Most Midas franchisees have joined the Association. 14
Non-Midas franchisees, however, were excluded from membership under
the Association's original bylaws. 15
The Association applied to the Internal Revenue Service for exemption
from income taxes as a "business league" under Code section 501(c)(6). 16
The Internal Revenue Service, however, restricts business league status to
organizations that are "directed to the improvement of business conditions of
one or more lines of business."' 1 7  Noting that the Midas dealers excluded
non-Midas dealers from membership, the Internal Revenue Service rejected
the Association's initial application for tax exemption. 18 The Internal Rev-
enue Service stated that the business league exemption would not apply to
an organization that was not industry wide. 19 After eliminating the re-
quirement that members be Midas franchisees, the Association submitted a
second application, but the Internal Revenue Service again denied tax
exemption to the Association. 20
Following the second rejection, the Association filed income tax returns
and then filed suit in federal district court to recover the taxes paid with
those returns. 21 The United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York dismissed the Association's complaint. 22 Using the Internal
Revenue Service "line of business" test, 2 3 the district court held that the
12. 440 U.S. at 473. In negotiating with Midas, the Association has proved to be a success-
ful bargaining agent. For example, Midas dropped its requirement that customers pay a service
charge when a guaranteed muffler was replaced. In addition, Midas' right to terminate fran-
chises was significantly limited. Id.
13. Id. at 473-74. Secondary activities include publishing a newsletter, hosting an annual
convention, and offering group insurance to members.
14. Id. at 473 n.2. During the tax years in question (1971-73), approximately 50% of all
Midas franchisees were members. By 1975, this figure had soared to approximately 80%.
15. See id. at 474. Although the requirement that Association members be Midas fran-
chisees later was dropped from the bylaws, the Association at no time recruited nor accepted a
member who was not a Midas franchisee. See 'note 20 and accompanying text infra.
16. 440 U.S. at 474.
17. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(6)-1 (1978). For the full regulatory text, see note 7 supra.
18. 440 U.S. at 474. According to the Internal Revenue Service, the Association was not
directed to the improvement of one or more "lines of business" and therefore did not meet the
regulatory requirement for qualification as a business league. Id.
19. Id., quoting letter from District Director (New York), Internal Revenue Service, to Na-
tional Muffler Dealers Association (March 28, 1972).
20. Id. at 474. See National Muffler Dealers Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 565 F.2d 845 (2d
Cir. 1977). The Second Circuit suggested that the Association's open door amendment was
motivated solely by tax considerations, but the court did not state to what extent this suggested
lack of a "valid business purpose" affected its decision. Id. at 845-46.
21. 440 U.S. at 475.
22. National Muffler Dealers Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, No. 77-6106 (S.D.N.Y. May 24,
1977).
23. See notes 7 & 17 supra.
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applicable line of business encompassed all muffler franchisees, not just
Midas franchisees. The district court then found no evidence that the Midas
Association benefited the larger, generic group. 24
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. 25 Like the district
court, the Second Circuit upheld the "line of business" test. 26 The court
then had little difficulty in concluding that, under the test, the Association's
application for exemption properly had been denied. 27 The Association ap-
pealed once again, and the United States Supreme Court granted its petition
for certiorari. 28
BACKGROUND LAW: DEFINITION OF A BUSINESS LEAGUE
An organization must meet three separate statutory tests before it can
qualify for the business league exemption. First, the organization must be a
business league. Secondly, it must not be organized for profit. Finally, the
organization's earnings must not inure to any private benefit. 29 Exemption
has been denied for failure to meet any one of the three tests, 30 but only
the first test was at issue in National Muffler. 31 The Second Circuit, even
24. National Muffler Dealers Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, No. 77-6106 (S.D.N.Y. May 24,
1977).
25. National Muffler Dealers Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 565 F.2d at 848.
26. Id. at 847.
27. Id. The Second Circuit, in applying the "line of business" test, noted the parochial
nature of the Association's membership and activities. Id. The court did not, however, delineate
the interplay between membership and activities. A finding of limited membership, and a find-
ing of parochial activity, could be either joint or alternative grounds for denial of exemption.
Neither the Second Circuit nor the United States Supreme Court apparently found it necessary
to decide this question, as both courts found that the Association possessed neither broadly-
based membership nor widely beneficial activities.
28. National Muffler Dealers Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 436 U.S. 903 (1978).
29. I.R.C. § 501(c)(6). See also National Muffler Dealers Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 565
F.2d at 846; Northwestern Municipal Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 99 F.2d 460, 461 (8th Cir.
1938); 6 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 34.20 (1975); Note, supra note 4, at
633.
30. For cases denying exemption to associations found to be organized for profit, see, e.g.,
Clay Sewer Pipe Ass'n, Inc. v. Commissioner, 139 F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1943) (organization that
was chartered under Ohio law as a "corporation for profit" was also organized for profit for tax
purposes); Northwestern Municipal Ass'n v. United States, 99 F.2d 460 (8th Cir. 1938) (associa-
tion chartered under Minnesota Business Corporation Act held organized for profit).
For cases denying exemption to associations whose earnings were found to inure to private
benefit, see, e.g., Evanston-North Shore Bd. of Realtors v. United States, 320 F.2d 375 (Ct.
C1. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 931 (1964) (earnings of a realtor group that provided a listing
service inured to the benefit of individual participating realtors); Northwestern Jobbers' Credit
Bureau v. Commissioner, 37 F.2d 880 (8th Cir. 1930) (earnings of a trade group that provided
legal and accounting services to members inured to the benefit of private shareholders or indi-
viduals). The Northwestern court also found the trade group to be organized for profit. Id. at
883. Both logic and a survey of the cases suggest that there might be a significant correlation
between the "organization for profit" and "inurement of earnings" tests. See e.g., Webster &
Combs, 331 T.M. Trade Associations at A-2-3.
31. National Muffler Dealers Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 565 F.2d at 846.
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in denying the Association's claim, conceded that there was no challenge to
either the Association's nonprofit status or to its disposition of earnings.
Rather, its decision was based on the premise that the Midas dealers did not
fall within the business league definition. 32
Although the legislative history behind the business league exemption is
scanty, it appears that congressional intent was to exempt only associations
that aid an entire industry. 33 The Internal Revenue Service then assumed
the responsibility of defining "business league." The first definition was
promulgated in a 1919 regulation; it restated the not-for-profit statutory re-
quirement, but contained no requirement that a business league benefit an
entire line of business. 34 This requirement was not added until 1929, when
the Internal Revenue Service rewrote its interpretative regulation.35
Although an occasional court 36 has attempted to write its own definition of
"business league," most courts now embrace the Internal Revenue Service
definition as expressed in the "line of business" regulation. 3 The regula-
tion itself, 38 however, is open to conflicting interpretations; perhaps the
most reliable guide of what a business league is can be found by examining
the case precedent relating to various types of organizations. The business
league exemption has been granted 3 9 and denied 40 to innumerable associa-
32. Id.
33. See Briefs and Statements on H.R. 3321, filed with the Senate Committee on Finance,
63d Cong., 1st Sess., 2002-3 (1913).
34. Treas. Reg. 45, art. 518 (1919) stated:
A business league is an association of persons having some common business in-
terest, which limits its activities to work for such common interest and does not
engage in a regular business of a kind ordinarily carried on for profit. Its work need
not be similar to that of a chamber of commerce or board of trade.
35. See Treas. Reg. 74, art. 528 (1929), which stated:
[A business league is] an organization of the same general class as a chamber of
commerce or board of trade. Thus, its activity should be directed to the improve-
ment of business conditions or to the promotion of general objects of one or more
lines of business as distinguished from the performance of particular services for
individual persons.
Note the similarity of the above language to the present regulation. See note 7 supra.
36. Crooks v. Kansas City Hay Dealers' Ass'n, 37 F.2d 83 (8th Cir. 1929). The Kansas City
Hay Dealers court attempted to define the term "business league" by examining standard dic-
tionary definitions of the words "business" and "league." Id. at 85.
37. See note 50 and accompanying text infra.
38. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(6)-1 (1978). See note 7 supra.
39. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Chicago Graphic Arts Fed'n, 128 F.2d 424 (7th Cir. 1974)
(organization promoting fair practices in the printing industry held exempt); Retail Credit Ass'n
of Minneapolis v. United States, 30 F. Supp. 855 (D. Minn. 1938) (retail association formed to
educate public in the value of credit held exempt); Rev. Rul. 76-400, 1976-2 C.B. 153 (associa-
tion to promote the acceptance of women in business and the professions held exempt). Gener-
ally, in accordance with the line of business test, exemption has been allowed only to organiza-
tions that benefit an entire industry or all components of an industry within a geographical area.
40. See, e.g., Contracting Plumbers Cooperative Restoration Corp. v. United States, 488
F.2d 684 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 827 (1974) (plumbers' cooperative formed to
facilitate post-construction street repair held nonexempt); Rev. Rul. 76-38, 1976-1 C.B. 157
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tions, with courts scrutinizing the type of association seeking exemption, its
organization, and its activities in order to determine whether the association
can fit under the statutory business league umbrella.
Prior to National Muffler, the only case that applied the business league
exemption to a common franchisor association was Pepsi-Cola Bottlers' As-
sociation, Inc. v. United States.41 In Pepsi, the Seventh Circuit allowed a
business league exemption to a common franchisor association of soft drink
bottlers. In granting the exemption, the Pepsi court stated that the bottlers'
association could not be disqualified "merely because its members all bottle
a particular soft drink product."4 2
The Pepsi decision, however, was criticized on several grounds. In its
nonacquiescence to the decision, 43 the Internal Revenue Service stated that
an organization promoting a single product could not qualify for the business
league exemption.44 The dissent in Pepsi argued that the association failed
to meet the "line of business" test because bottling Pepsi-Cola was only one
of many businesses in the soft drink industry and not a line of business in
itself. 45 One commentator doubted Pepsi's precedential value, 4  while
another criticized the decision on the ground that it gave a competitive ad-
vantage to one company within an industry.47
In construing the term "business league," therefore, the National Muffler
Court faced sparse legislative history, two Internal Revenue Service defini-
tions, and voluminous prior case law capped by intercircuit conflict. 48 The
United States Supreme Court resolved these ambiguities in National Muffler
by affirming the Second Circuit's denial of the Midas dealer's exemption
claim. 49
(credit union association that made interest-free loans to member credit unions held nonexempt
because activity benefited only member businesses); Rev. Rul. 73-411, 1973-2 C.B. 180 (shop-
ping center merchants' association held not to improve any line of business, but only the indi-
vidual business interests of members).
41. 369 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1966). See note 9 supra.
42. Id. at 252.
43. Nonacquiescence is formal Internal Revenue Service disagreement with the result
reached in a particular tax case. The effect of nonacquiescence is that the Internal Revenue
Service will relitigate the issue, usually in a different, and perhaps more friendly, circuit. See
BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 947 (5th ed. 1979).
44. Rev. Rul. 68-182, 1968-1 C.B. 263. After a restatement of the applicable statute and
regulations, the Internal Revenue Service stated only that organizations promoting a single
brand or product could not qualify for the business league exemption; therefore, the Internal
Revenue Service would not follow the Pepsi decision.
45. Pepsi-Cola Bottlers' Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 369 F.2d at 252-53 (Kiley, J., dissent-
ing).
46. Note, Business League Exemption Granted to Association of One Brand-Name Product,
16 KANSAS L. REv. 113, 116 (1967).
47. Note, 35 FoRDHAM L. REv. 738, 742 (1967). Although the author is not explicit, the
competitive advantage would result from the Pepsi bottlers not having to pay income taxes,
while bottlers of competing brands would be saddled with this extra expense.
48. See notes 8-9 and accompanying text supra.
49. 440 U.S. at 489.
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ANALYSIS OF THE MAJORITY OPINION
The National Muffler opinion involved a two-step process: 1) validating
the line of business test, and 2) applying that test to deny the Midas dealers
their exemption. The first step is supported by a clear line of lower-court
decisions. 50 The second step also appears-proper in light of the National
Muffler fact situation.
In construing the term "business league," the National Muffler majority
noted that the term had no well-defined meaning outside the perimeters of
Code section 501(c)(6).51 Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun de-
clared that, in such a situation, the Supreme Court customarily defers to the
Internal Revenue Service's interpretive regulations as long as they imple-
ment the statute in some reasonable manner. 52 The Court then listed the
following criteria for determining whether a regulation's manner of im-
plementation is reasonable: the length of time the regulation has been in
effect, its harmony and contemporaneity with the statute, the degree of con-
50. The liine of business regulation has been upheld in at least four circuits as well as the
Court of Claims. See, e.g., United States v. Oklahoma City Retailers Ass'n, 331 F.2d 328 (10th
Cir. 1964) (merchants' group that supplied credit information for a fee held nonexempt; court
upheld the line of business regulation, citing only to precedent in other circuits); Automotive
Elec. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1948) (exemption denied to auto parts
store that published catalog; court upheld line of business regulation, stating that the regulation
had been in effect for 30 years, that it had survived several congressional re-enactments of the
underlying statute, and that exemption provisions must be strictly construed in favor of the
taxing authority); Apartment Operations Ass'n v. Commissioner, 136 F.2d 435 (9th Cir. 1943)
(apartment owners' association that furnished credit information held nonexempt; court upheld
the line of business regulation, stating that it was "early adopted" and that it has "remained
substantially unchanged through repeated re-enactments of the pertinent statute"); Underwrit-
ers Laboratories v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 371 (7th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 756
(1943) (fire insurers' association providing claims adjustment services held nonexempt; court
stated that the "long standing" regulation had survived statutory re-enactments and thus had
taken on "the quality of law"); Evanston-North Shore Board of Realtors v. United States, 320
F.2d 375 (Ct. Cl. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 931 (1964) (realtor board providing listing ser-
vices held nonexempt; court accorded the business league regulation "the force of law" based on
the fact that the regulation remained "unchanged through repeated statutory re-enactments").
51. 440 U.S. at 476.
52. Id. at 476-77. A number of rationales support the doctrine of judicial deference to in-
terpretive regulations. One is that legislative re-enactment of the underlying statute constitutes
tacit congressional approval of the interpretive regulation. See, e.g., Helvering v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 306 U.S. 110 (1939) (Congress must be taken to have approved the administrative
construction and thereby to have given it the force of law). A second rationale is that interpre-
tive regulations frequently are issued contemporaneously with the underlying statute and there-
fore constitute a timely, and presumably more reliable, interpretation of the law. See, e.g.,
Commissioner v. South Texas Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496 (1948) (regulations constitute contem-
poraneous constructions by those charged with administration of these statutes and should not
be overruled except for weighty reasons). Finally, it has been argued that taxpayers can rely on
interpretive regulations in structuring transactions. Judicial deference to the regulations, there-
fore, will result in consistent treatment for all taxpayers. See H.R. REP. No. 1882, 70th Cong.,
1st Sess. 22 (1927).
1980] 875
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gressional scrutiny during any statutory re-enactments, and the regulation's
consistency of application by the Internal Revenue Service. 53
Applying these criteria to the business league regulation, the Court noted
that the line of business language has existed since 1929, 54 during which
time there have been several re-enactments of and one amendment to the
underlying statute.55 Regarding the regulation's contemporaneity with the
underlying statute, Justice Blackmun noted that the 1929 regulation was not
contemporaneous with the 1913 statute, and that the prior 1919 regulation 56
contained no line of business requirement. Recognizing that the Association
would have qualified as a business league under the 1919 definition, the
National Muffler majority stated that contemporaneity, 57 as only one consid-
eration, "need not control here." 58
Addressing the regulation's consistency of application, the National Muf-
fler majority inferred that, in prior cases, "line of business" generally has
been interpreted to mean either an entire industry 59 or all industry compo-
nents within a geographical area. 60 This, coupled with the Internal Rev-
enue Service's consistent denial of exemption to groups marketing a single
branded product, 61 led the National Muffler majority to conclude that the
53. 440 U.S. at 477.
54. The 1929 regulation is reprinted at note 35 supra.
55. 440 U.S. at 482. The amendment to I.R.C. § 501(c)(6) occurred in 1966, when Congress
added professional football leagues to the list of exempt organizations. This addition would ap-
pear to have little effect on the scope of the business league exemption, particularly in light of
House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Mills' statement that "no inference is intended
by this change as to the applicability of section 501(c)(6) to other types of organizations." 112
CONG. REC. 28228 (1966).
56. See note 34 supra.
57. Note that the 1919 regulation, written six years after the 1913 statute, is itself not per-
fectly contemporaneous. The 1919 regulation was, however, the initial administrative interpreta-
tion of the business league exemption. 440 U.S. at 480.
58. Id. at 485. Dissenting Justices Stewart, Rehnquist, and Stevens apparently agreed with
the majority that the Association would have met the 1919 test. Id. at 489 (Stewart, J., dissent-
ing).
59. See, e.g., American Plywood Ass'n v. United States, 267 F. Supp. 830 (W.D. Wash.
1967) (court upheld the line of business test and granted an exemption to trade association
devoted to promoting the use of plywood on basis that plywood manufacture constituted the
required line of business); National Leather & Shoe Finders Ass'n v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 121
(1947) (association of wholesalers of shoe repair supplies operated training programs and pub-
lished trade journal; again, line of business test upheld but association found to satisfy test-
exemption granted).
60. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Chicago Graphic Arts Fed'n, Inc., 128 F.2d 424 (7th Cir.
1942) (group formed to promote fair trade practices among Chicago printers; line of business
test upheld but Chicago printers found to constitute the required line of business-exemption
granted); Washington State Apples, Inc. v. Commissioner, 46 B.T.A. 64 (1942) (organization
formed to promote the sale of Washington apples; Washington apples found to constitute the
required line of business-exemption granted). The National Muffler majority's notation of
these cases is found at 440 U.S. at 483.
61. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 68-182, 1968-1 C.B. 263 (announcing nonacquiescence in Pepsi de-
cision); Rev. Rul. 67-77, 1967-1 C.B. 138 (single brand of automobile); Rev. Rul. 58-294, 1958-1
C.B. 244 (patented product).
[Vol. 29:869
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Internal Revenue Service had administered the business league regulation
consistently. 62
Reviewing all of the criteria, the National Muffler majority concluded that
the Internal Revenue Service regulation was a reasonable interpretation of
the business league exemption. 63 This conclusion appears well supported
both by logic and by a clear line of lower court decisions. 64
Justice Blackmun then applied the line of business test to the National
Muffler fact situation. Although this portion of the opinion is not exten-
sive, 65 the Court appears correct in concluding that the Midas dealers did
not meet the "line of business" test. 66 The district court had held that the
Association failed the test. 67 Thus, a reversal would have sidestepped the
customary defierence accorded the trier of fact. 68 Also, the marketing of a
branded product such as Midas-Mufflers does not qualify as a line of busi-
ness because Congress apparently intended to exempt only those organiza-
tions that aid an entire industry. 69 Manufacturers use branding to differen-
tiate their products from competing wares. The mere existence of branding,
therefore, is an indication that the branding manufacturer considers other
brands tcr be relevant competition-that there is some common "line of bus-
iness" within which the brands compete.
62. 440 U.S. at 484.
63. Id.
64. See note 50 supra.
65. 440 U.S. at 488-89. The Court stated only that the Internal Revenue Service view
merits serious deference and that the Association had not shown that either the regulation or
the commissioner's interpretation of it failed to implement the congressional mandate in some
reasonable manner.
66. Conceivably, the National Muffler Court could have accepted the Internal Revenue
Service line of business test while rejecting the Internal Revenue Service result of that test.
Validating a regulation's text and validating its subsequent application to facts are two distinct
steps which should not be confused. An Internal Revenue Service regulation may be accorded
the force of law, but if the Internal Revenue Service also receives an exclusive license to inter-
pret the regulation, courts will have forfeited their judicial function to an administrative agency.
See, e.g., Biddle v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 573 (1938); Mercantile Bank & Trust Co. v. United
States, 441 F.2d 364 (8th Cir. 1970). These cases hold that revenue rulings (Internal Revenue
Service interpretations of the code and regulations) are not binding on the courts.
67. See notes 22-24 and accompanying text supra.
68. The Association had advanced an alternative argument at the appellate level: that its
activities benefited the line of business of all muffler franchisees because non-Midas franchisees
would seek and be accorded the benefits won by Midas dealers. National Muffler Dealers Ass'n,
Inc. v. United States, 565 F.2d at 847. The Second Circuit, however, accepted the trial court's
finding that the Association failed to benefit muffler dealers in general. Id. At the Supreme
Court level, Justice Blackmun distilled the Association's argument into a contention that the
Internal Revenue Service regulation was unreasonable. 440 U.S. at 484. In upholding the regu-
lation, the National Muffler majority disposed of this argument. The possibility that the Associa-
tion might have passed the line of business test appears to have been ignored at the Supreme
Court level, perhaps because of the district court's disposition of this essentially factual ques-
tion.
69. See note 33 and accompanying text supra.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
Pepsi-Cola Bottlers' Association, Inc. v. United States 70 appears to be the
only case in which manufacturers of a branded product qualified as a busi-
ness league. As previously discussed, however, the Pepsi decision was re-
ceived with less than total approval. 71 It appears that National Muffler has
further limited the persuasive value of Pepsi, perhaps to the vanishing
point. 72 However, the two cases arguably remain distinguishable. 73
The National Muffler result, therefore, appears sound. The Court's valida-
tion of the line of business regulation is supported by the regulation's fifty
year stability in the midst of statutory change. Similarly, the Court's use of
the regulation to deny exemption to the Association is supported by the
district court's finding that the Midas dealers in no way benefited the rest of
the muffler industry. 7 4
CRITICISM AND ALTERNATIVE:
AN OPERATIONAL LINE OF BUSINESS TEST
The soundness of the National Muffler result should not obscure the
Court's failure to clarify the exact applicability of the business league exemp-
tion to common franchisor associations. Although it is clear that the Court
upheld the line of business test, it is not clear exactly how the test will apply
to common franchisor associations. Perhaps the mere presence of a common
franchisor will not cause automatic failure of the line of business test, or
perhaps other facts will remain pertinent. 75
In analyzing the business league cases, commentators have suggested two
bases on which the tax exemption has been disallowed: 1) an organizational
70. 369 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1966). See note 9 and accompanying text supra. See also notes
41-48 and accompanying text supra.
71. See notes 41-48 and accompanying text supra.
72. In National Muffler, the Second Circuit stated only that it declined to follow Pepsi to
the extent the two cases conflicted. 565 F.2d at 847 n.l, The Supreme Court, however, went
further, stating that certiorari was granted to resolve the intercircuit conflict. 440 U.S. at 476.
This would seem to indicate that Pepsi now has been overruled.
73. The Midas dealers apparently sold no competing brands, whereas 90% of the Pepsi
association memers also bottled other soft drinks. 369 F.2d at 251. Also, the Pepsi association
sponsored management training programs for its members' executives. 369 F.2d at 251. This is
a quasi-public activity not present in National Muffler. Thus, although the National Muffler
Court stated that certiorari was granted to resolve the intercircuit conflict, a less expansive
reading might confine each case, National Muffler and Pepsi, to its own facts.
74. Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Rehnquist and Stevens, dissented in National Muf-
fler. In a one-paragraph opinion, Justice Stewart argued for the Association's exemption based
on Pepsi and on the original pro-Association regulation of 1919. 440 U.S. at 489 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
75. In National Muffler, the district court held the applicable line of business to be the
business of muffler franchisees taken as a whole. See note 24 and accompanying text supra.
Suppose, for example, that the Association's principal activity had been a radio and television
campaign exhorting the safety and noise-reduction benefits of all mufflers, without reference to
brand name. The line of business test would appear to have been met: the Association's ac-
tivities would have been directed to the improvement of the entire muffler industry, even
though all Association members continued to own Midas franchises.
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test, and 2) an operational test. 76 Under the first test, an association claim-
ing exemption must demonstrate that it has been organized in such a way
that inurement of earnings will not occur. 77 Once this first-level test is
surmounted, an organization merits continued exemption only by dem-
onstrating that its activities benefit the required line of business. Where an
association's activities benefit interests too parochial to qualify as a line of
business, tax exemption will be denied 78 or revoked. 7
In cases denying the business league exemption, the reasoning of the
courts often is unclear because of failure to specify which test is being
applied. The association in question may have failed both the organizational
and operational tests. 80 National Muffler appears to be such a case. 8l The
National Muffler Court suggested that it was using an organizational test
when it stated that the Internal Revenue Service consistently has denied the
business league exemption to groups whose memberhip and purposes are
less than industry wide. 82 The Court also noted, however, that the Associa-
tion's principal activity had been service as a bargaining agent in negotia-
tions with Midas. 83 This implies that it was the principal activity of the
Association, an operational test, which caused the denial of exemption. Thus,
either an organizational or an operational test could support the National
Muffler result.
The National Muffler holding likely will be interpreted as organizational:
the presence of a common franchisor causes automatic failure of the line of
business test. Such a holding, however, might be overinclusive. 84 In addi-
tion, any such holding would invite speculative follow-up questions regard-
ing what degree of commonality would be necessary to poison a business
league exemption. Any statistical definition of commonality would be both
overinclusive and underinclusive; any non-quantitative definition would be
vague.
76. See, e.g., Webster & Combs, TAx MCM'T (BNA) § 331, at A-2-3; Note, supra note 4,
at 634-35.
77. See, e.g., Clay Sewer Pipe Ass'n, Inc. v. Commissioner, 139 F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1943)
(association held organized for profit because chartered under state corporation statute); Louis-
ville Credit Men's Adjustment Bureau v. United States, 6 F. Supp. 196 (W.D. Ky. 1934) (or-
ganization held nonexempt when charter was "that of the ordinary private commercial corpora-
tion").
78. See, e.g., Apartment Operations Ass'n v. Commissioner, 136 F.2d 435 (9th Cir. 1943)
(building owners' group held to be a nonexempt "cooperative buying organization" when mem-
bers used group to take advantage of quantity purchase discounts).
79. See, e.g., Southern Hardwood Traffic Ass'n v. United States, 283 F. Supp. 1013 (W.D.
Tenn. 1968) (original exemption revoked after freight association engaged in business activities;
even in revoking exemption the court admitted that taxpayer's organization remained proper).
80. See Webster & Combs, TAx MCM'T (BNA) § 331, at A-3.
81. The opinion does not contain the terms organizational or operational, nor does it contain
clear synonyms. The major part of the opinion is devoted to validation of the regulatory line of
business test, without delineating whether the test will be applied on organizational or opera-
tional grounds.
82. 440 U.S. at 483-84.
83. Id. at 473.
84. See example at note 75 supra.
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As the Pepsi-Cola Bottlers' Association noted in its amicus curiae brief,
"[a]n Association of persons selling a branded product, or of franchisees of a
common franchisor, is subject to the same standards under Section 501(c)(6)
as is any other not-for-profit trade association." 85 The Association went on
to suggest that no court should invest the line of business language with a
rigid meaning that a priori precludes exemption for any one category of
trade association. 86
One answer to the above criticism would be to interpret National Muffler
as an operational holding. Under this interpretation, the Association's activ-
ity as a bargaining agent caused failure of the line of business test. 87 This
approach is preferrable for two reasons. First, it adheres strictly to the lan-
guage of the line of business test, which mandates that an association's ac-
tivities be directed to the improvement of one or more lines of business. 88
Secondly, an operational application of the line of business test would sub-
ject common franchisor associations to the same exemption standards as
other types of associations. This would avoid the problems of overinclusivity
and unfairness involved in denying exemption to all common franchisor as-
sociations based solely on membership grounds. 89
The problem, of course, is that most members of an organization derive
benefits from the organization's activities. Few people would join an or-
ganization if they did not receive some benefit. 90 In the business league
context, however, the question should be whether the benefit is based on
co-membership in the line of business or whether it is based on a more
parochial, albeit concurrent, commonality. An acid test might be the extent
that members of the line of business who are not members of the association
benefit from the association's activities.
This test probably would not have changed the National Muffler outcome,
for the National Muffler court found no evidence that the Midas association
benefited the non-Midas segment of the muffler line of business.9 1 The
85. Brief for Pepsi-Cola Bottlers' Association, Inc., as Amicus Curiae, at 14, National Muf-
fler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979).
86. 1d. at 25. A holding that no common franchisor association can qualify as a business
league arguably discriminates in two ways: it benefits independent distributors at the expense of
franchisees, and it benefits generic products at the expense of branded wares. These distinctions
appear difficult to justify.
87. Note that the Court found service as a bargaining agent (and even then only in negotia-
tions with Midas) to be the Association's principal activity. 440 U.S. at 473. Note also the
district court's finding that this activity failed to benefit the applicable line of business, which
was held to be muffler franchisees taken as a whole. See note 24 and accompanying text supra.
88. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(6)-1 (1978) (emphasis added). The full text of the regulation is
reprinted at note 7 supra.
89. See notes 84-86 and accompanying text supra.
90. "Human experience has taught us that few men would join an organization if they did
not derive at least some benefit out of it." Omaha Live Stock Traders Exch. v. United States,
244 F. Supp. 384, 387 (D. Neb. 1965).
91. National Muffler Dealers Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, No. 77-6106 (S.D.N.Y. May 24,
1977).
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distinction between organizational and operational testing, however, might
take on greater importance in a case where the taxpayer would pass one test
and fail the other.
CONCLUSION:
ANSWERED AND UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
For tax exemption purposes, the National Muffler Court embraced the
Internal Revenue Service definition of business league, including that defini-
tion's line of business test. In so doing, the Court significantly limited the
exemption's applicability to common franchisor associations. The Court also
continued its policy of deference to the Internal Revenue Service. 92
Regarding common franchisor associations, however, several questions
remain unanswered. Foremost among these is whether the line of business
test is organizational or operational. If the test is organizational, then the
degree of "outside" membership necessary to secure a tax exemption needs
to be specified. If the test is operational, then criteria are needed both to
define "line of business" and to specify what types of activities will be held
to benefit the defined lines. One alternative would be to focus on an associa-
tion's activities-an operational test-and on the extent that these activities
benefit nonmembers of the association who are members of the "line of bus-
iness."
By embracing the line of business test, the National Muffler Court at-
tempted to resolve intercircuit conflict concerning the applicability of the
business league exemption to franchisee organizations. By not specifying how
the test could be met, however, National Muffler may well have posed more
questions than it answered.
Robert Charkovsky
92. "The choice among reasonable interpretations is for the Commissioner, not the courts."
440 U.S. at 488.
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